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This Article considers the evidence that should be collected and 
developed to support the next generation of reforms before a future 
Supreme Court. It discusses but ultimately sidesteps theoretical debates 
over rationales for reform, focusing instead on the practical questions 
likely to face future policymakers, lawyers, and expert witnesses. 
Drilling down into the ample evidentiary record in McConnell v. 
Federal Election Commission, we address the types of evidence that 
should be amassed by supporters of future regulation. This evidentiary 
record, we suggest, will be essential in both formulating the next 
generation of campaign finance reform and in defending it in court. We 
argue that, regardless of whether one favors an anti-corruption or 
egalitarian rationale for regulation, the evidentiary record should focus 
on conflicts of interest—in particular, on whether a reasonable 
legislator would feel pressure to act in way that is different from the 
preferences of her constituents or the public interest. This is something 
more than a showing of unequal access, but something less than a 
showing of actual influence on policymaking. In the near term, our 
suggestions are designed to help define a research agenda for 
qualitative and quantitative empirical researchers. In the long term, they 
offer a roadmap for the legislators shaping and the lawyers defending 
future regulations before a Supreme Court less reflexively antagonistic 
to reform than the current one. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A persistent feature of campaign finance discourse has been 
disagreement over rationales for regulation. Proponents and 
opponents of reform have tangled repeatedly with each other, often in 
caustic terms, over whether there are any good reasons for public 
financing, disclosure requirements, restrictions on expenditures and 
contributions. The debate among reform-minded scholars and 
advocates has been almost as fervent. Particularly unrelenting, no 
doubt interminably so to some observers, is the longstanding debate 
over whether regulation should be aimed at preventing corruption or 
promoting equality. 
With the Roberts Court having emphatically rejected egalitarian 
rationales and having severely constricted the anti-corruption 
rationale, this debate is now largely academic—not in a bad sense, but 
in the sense of being mostly of interest to academics. Five justices 
firmly adhere to a narrow conception of corruption, limited to quid 
pro quo transactions. To the extent that there has been any lingering 
doubt about the majority’s narrow conception of corruption, 
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission1 definitively resolved it.2 
There is no good reason to believe that the five justices in the 
majority will change their minds. Thus, as long as the current Court 
sits, we should not expect to see any significant change in the 
constitutional law surrounding campaign finance regulation. The anti-
corruption rationale will remain narrow, and the equality rationale 
will be off the table. As long as that remains the case, the options 
available to reform-minded advocates will be extremely limited. 
While not denying the importance of theoretical debates over the 
rationales for regulation, for two reasons we think it is more 
important to focus attention on the evidence that should be amassed 
to support the next generation of campaign finance reform. First, 
examination of the effects of money on the political process—
including the independent expenditures flooding the system since 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission3—will be essential in 
shaping the next generation of campaign finance reforms and 
shepherding them through the legislative process. Second, 
documentation of these effects will be necessary in defending these 
 
 1.  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).   
 2.  Id. at 1441 (“Any regulation must instead target what we have called ‘quid pro quo’ 
corruption or its appearance.”). 
 3.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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reforms in court.  Even if the Court’s composition shifts, such that 
there is no longer a majority hostile to campaign finance regulation, 
the Court is unlikely to give a blank check to legislators in regulating 
campaign money—nor do we think it should, given concerns 
regarding free speech and entrenchment. The evidence amassed in 
support of regulation will therefore be essential not only in crafting 
legislation, but also in demonstrating that legislation is appropriately 
tailored. 
This article therefore considers the evidence that should be 
collected and developed to support the next generation of reforms 
before a future Supreme Court. It discusses but ultimately sidesteps 
theoretical debates over rationales for reform, focusing instead on the 
practical questions likely to be faced by future policymakers, lawyers, 
and expert witnesses. Drilling down into the ample evidentiary record 
in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,4 we address the types 
of evidence that should be amassed by supporters of future 
regulation. This evidentiary record, we suggest, will be essential both 
in formulating the next generation of campaign finance reforms and 
in defending it in court. The recent plurality and dissenting opinions in 
McCutcheon highlight the pressing need for such evidence with 
respect to the current federal campaign finance system. 
We argue that, regardless of whether one favors an anti-
corruption or egalitarian rationale for regulation, the evidentiary 
record should focus on conflicts of interest—in particular, on whether 
a reasonable legislator would feel pressure to act in a way that is 
different from the preferences of her constituents or the public 
interest. This is something more than a showing of unequal access, but 
something less than a showing of actual influence on policymaking. In 
the near term, our suggestions are designed to help define a research 
agenda for qualitative and quantitative empirical researchers. In the 
long term, they offer a roadmap for legislators and lawyers to shape 
and defend future regulations before a Supreme Court that is less 
reflexively antagonistic to reform than the current one. 
The article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the rationales for 
regulation accepted and rejected by the Supreme Court over time, 
focusing especially on the shifting anti-corruption rationale. Part II 
canvasses the academic debate over the justifications for regulation, 
including current and prior iterations of the equality versus anti-
 
 4.  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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corruption debate. We draw from this debate the lesson that, 
regardless of one’s underlying conception of the values properly 
served by reform, reformers should focus on conflicts of interest in 
amassing an evidentiary record. Part III traces this notion through a 
close examination of the evidentiary record developed in support of 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) for McConnell 
v. Federal Election Commission. Part V sketches the sort of evidence 
that ought to be developed for the next Court, focusing on how 
independent expenditures create conflicts of interest in the legislative 
process. 
I.  THE SHIFTING ANTI-CORRUPTION RATIONALE 
We start by canvassing the rationales for regulation that have 
been accepted and rejected by the Supreme Court. On a superficial 
level, the Court has been consistent in accepting the prevention of 
corruption and appearance of corruption as rationales that justify 
regulation, while rejecting the promotion of equality. In reality, the 
anti-corruption rationale has been an accordion in the Court’s hands, 
starting off narrow, then broadening in cases like Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce5 and McConnell, only to contract again in the 
hands of the Roberts Court. 
The story of modern campaign finance doctrine begins with 1976’s 
Buckley v. Valeo.6 In reviewing the 1974 Amendments to the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA),7 the Supreme Court set the 
constitutional parameters for the regulation of money in politics. First, 
contributions and expenditures differ in the degree of First 
Amendment protection they enjoy.8 Second, restrictions on either 
must be justified in terms of anti-corruption, not equality.9 
 
 5.  Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 6.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).   
 7.  Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 
1263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
 8.  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 (“[A]lthough the Act's contribution and expenditure 
limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings 
impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and 
association than do its limitations on financial contributions.”). At the risk of over-
simplification, the distinction between contributions and expenditures is essentially this:  a 
contribution is money given to a candidate or party or political action committee; an 
expenditure is money directly spent on advertising or staff time or for any other political good, 
in order to benefit a candidate, party, or political action. 
 9.  See id. at 54 (“The ancillary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of 
candidates competing for elective office . . . is clearly not sufficient to justify the provision’s 
infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights.”). 
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The reasoning behind Buckley’s contribution-expenditure 
distinction was twofold. First, the Court concluded that there was a 
difference between the First Amendment interests implicated by 
contributions and those implicated by expenditures. While 
contribution limitations impose “only a marginal restriction upon the 
contributor’s ability to engage in free communication,”10 restrictions 
on expenditures “impose direct and substantial restraints on the 
quantity of political speech.”11 A contribution to a candidate or group 
generally expresses support for the recipient, but neither conveys the 
contributor’s reasons nor equates the amount given with any quantity 
of speech.12 The “primary First Amendment concern” raised by 
restricting contributions is therefore not the contributor’s free speech 
rights but rather her freedom of association.13 To be constitutional, 
such a restriction need only be justified by an important 
governmental interest and closely drawn to avoid unnecessary 
interference with the contributor’s associational rights.14 The Court 
later clarified that this is something less than strict scrutiny.15 By 
contrast, direct expenditures on campaign communications—whether 
by a candidate, an individual, or an interest group—fund the 
“[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of 
candidates [that] are integral to the operation” of our system of 
government.16 Limitations on expenditures restrict that discussion by 
reducing “the number of issues . . . , the depth of their exploration, and 
the size of the audience reached.”17 Thus, they face more exacting 
scrutiny.18 
The second reason for Buckley’s distinction between contributions 
and expenditures concerned the government’s interest in regulation. 
The Court found that the contribution limits, but not expenditure 
limits, could be justified by an interest in preventing corruption and its 
appearance. Three interests were offered to justify the FECA 
amendments’ restriction on contributions: prevention of corruption 
and the appearance of corruption; equalization of citizens’ relative 
ability to influence electoral outcomes; and curbing the increasing 
 
 10.  Id. at 20. 
 11.  Id. at 28. 
 12.  Id. at 21. 
 13.  Id. at 24. 
 14.  Id. at 25 (citations omitted). 
 15.  See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).  
 16.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14. 
 17.  Id. at 19. 
 18.  See Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 386 (discussing the standards of review used in Buckley). 
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costs of political campaigns.19 The Buckley Court found the threat of 
actual or apparent corruption sufficient to justify contribution limits, 
obviating the need to address the other two interests.20 
The Court engaged in a more extensive discussion of the interests 
supporting regulation in connection with the FECA amendments’ 
expenditure restrictions.21 After construing the statutory language of 
the $1,000 expenditure cap to avoid vagueness problems—in what 
would come to be known as the “magic words” test for express 
advocacy22—Buckley rejected the argument that the expenditure 
limits could be justified as a means to “maximize[e] the effectiveness 
of the less intrusive contribution limitations.”23 It also held the anti-
corruption interest inadequate to support expenditure limits. The 
Court found that expenditures made “totally independently of the 
candidate and his campaign”24 gave rise to “substantially diminished 
potential for abuse”;25 the lack of coordination eliminated the 
possibility of a quid pro quo. 
After rejecting anti-circumvention and anti-corruption as interests 
that could support expenditure limits, the Buckley Court turned to 
what it called “the ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the 
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of 
elections.”26 The government characterized this as an interest in 
democratizing federal elections by lessening the “disproportionate 
advantage, the distorting effect, of wealthy special interest groups.”27 
The Court rejected this rationale in emphatic and sweeping terms, 
labelling it “wholly foreign to the First Amendment” to limit the 
speech of some to enhance the relative voice of others.28 
 
 
 19.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25–26. 
 20.  Id. at 26–27. 
 21.  The Amendment set a $1,000 annual ceiling on expenditures “relative to a clearly-
identified candidate” for individuals and groups other than parties with candidates on the ballot, 
their campaigns, and political parties. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 §608(a)–(e) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 
U.S.C.). 
 22.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.  
 23.  Id. at 44. 
 24.  Id. at 47. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 48.  
 27.  Brief for the Att’y Gen. and the FEC at 23, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos. 
75-436, 75-437), 1975 WL 171459 at *23. 
 28.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49. 
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The consequence of Buckley was that individual contribution 
limits could be justified on anti-corruption grounds, while limits on 
individual expenditures could not be justified by this or any other 
interest. Less clear in Buckley’s wake was precisely what was meant 
by an anti-corruption interest and whether an understanding of 
corruption that went beyond quid pro quo might suffice to uphold 
regulations on expenditures. It is within that doctrinal space that the 
Supreme Court’s accordion expanded and contracted in subsequent 
years. 
The most notable expansion of the anti-corruption rationale was 
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s 1990 opinion for the Court in Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce.29 In that case, the Court upheld a 
Michigan law prohibiting corporations from using general treasury 
funds to make independent expenditures in support of or in 
opposition to candidates for state office.30 While purporting to rely on 
an anti-corruption rationale, Austin’s version of that rationale was 
quite different from the one articulated in Buckley. The justification 
embraced in Austin was not the avoidance of quid pro quo corruption 
or its appearance, but rather the prevention of a “different type of 
corruption in the political arena,”31 namely “the corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little 
or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political 
ideas.”32 Rejecting the characterization of the Michigan law in Justice 
Kennedy’s dissenting opinion—that the law was aimed at 
“equaliz[ing] the relative influence of speakers on elections,”33—the 
Court found instead that the law ensured that “expenditures reflect 
actual public support for the political ideas espoused by 
corporations.”34 Notwithstanding this disclaimer, some scholars 
(including one of the authors) have understood Austin as implicitly 
embracing an egalitarian rationale for campaign spending 
restrictions.35 
 
 29.  494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 30.  Id. at 654 (citing Michigan Campaign Finance Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §169.251, sec. 
51(1) (1979)). 
 31.  Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 34.  Id. at 660. 
 35.  Daniel P. Tokaji, The Obliteration of Equality in American Campaign Finance Law: A 
Trans-Border Comparison, 5 J. PARL. & POL. L. 381 (2011).  
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A decade after Austin, the Court again considered and upheld a 
state law restricting campaign money, this time in the form of 
individual contribution limits passed by the Missouri Legislature.36 
The Court’s decision in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC37 
clarified the level of scrutiny applicable to low contribution limits, 
including the quantum of evidence necessary to uphold them.38 Its 
main relevance here is in the Court’s explication of what counts as 
corruption. According to the Shrink Missouri Court, corruption is 
“not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to the 
broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large 
contributors.”39 Shrink Missouri made clear that “in addition to ‘quid 
pro quo arrangements,’”40 the anti-corruption interest encompassed 
“improper influence” and “opportunities for abuse” and was 
sufficiently compelling for Congress to “address the power of money 
‘to influence governmental action’ in ways less ‘blatant and specific’ 
than bribery.”41 Beyond the governmental interest in preventing 
actual corruption, Shrink Missouri also breathed new life into 
Buckley’s interest in preventing the appearance of corruption, 
warning: “Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the 
cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize 
the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.”42 
The Court further refined this expansive view of corruption in its 
decision in McConnell v. Federal Elections Commission,43 which 
upheld most of Congress’s revamping of federal campaign finance 
law, embodied in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA).44 We address the evidentiary record before the McConnell 
Court in detail below,45 but for present purposes, the critical point is its 
broad conception of the anti-corruption rationale. The McConnell 
plaintiffs argued that, “without concrete evidence of an instance in 
which a federal officeholder . . . actually switched a vote . . . Congress 
 
 36.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 130.032.1(1) (West 2008), repealed by S.B. 1038, 2008 Leg., (Mo. 
2008)). 
 37. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).  
 38. See id. at 384 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s reversal of the District Court’s summary 
judgment ruling).  
 39.  Id. at 389. 
 40.  Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976)). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 390. 
 43.  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 44.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified 
primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C).  
 45.  See section IV infra. 
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has not shown that there exists real or apparent corruption.”46 The 
Court responded on both the facts and the law, noting that the 
“evidence connects soft money to manipulations of the legislative 
calendar” in the form of congressional failure to act,47 and that Court 
precedent “firmly established that Congress’ legitimate interest 
extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption.”48 The 
corruption Congress could aim at was not as narrow as the quid pro 
quo the plaintiffs described, but instead encompassed “undue 
influence on an office holder’s judgment, and the appearance of such 
influence.”49 The evidence that large donors enjoyed special access 
and influence was therefore sufficient to justify BCRA’s ban on soft 
money. Justice Kennedy dissented, arguing that the anticorruption 
rationale articulated in Buckley could only support Congress’s power 
to regulate “federal candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of quids, 
whether or not the candidate or officeholder corruptly received 
them.”50 
The arrival of the Roberts Court provided a majority for Justice 
Kennedy’s narrower reading—what the McConnell majority called a 
“crabbed view”51 of the anti-corruption rationale.52 While Citizens 
United is probably best known for its recognition of corporate speech 
rights, this aspect of the ruling was really nothing new. The truly 
significant change in law wrought by Citizens United was its 
redefinition of the anti-corruption rationale. In striking down BCRA’s 
ban on corporate electioneering communications,53 Citizens United 
explicitly overruled Austin’s holding that anti-distortion was a form of 
corruption that could support restrictions on corporate expenditures.54 
The Court viewed the corruption-as-antidistortion rationale as 
antithetical to the principle that government has no interest “in 
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence 
 
 46.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 149. 
 47.  Id. at 150. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 
(2001)). 
 50.  Id. at 294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 51.  Id. at 152. 
 52.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Chief Justice Rehnquist, who voted with 
the majority in Austin passed away in 2005 and was replaced by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice O’Connor, a co-author of the majority opinion as to Titles I and II in McConnell retired 
in 2006 and was replaced by Justice Alito. 
 53.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 203, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (West 2014). 
 54.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350. 
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the outcome of elections.”55 According to the Citizens United majority, 
the only interest that could justify restrictions on campaign money 
was the prevention of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.56 As 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court put it: “That speakers may 
have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that 
those officials are corrupt. And the appearance of influence or access 
will not cause the electorate to lose faith in this democracy.”57 Citizens 
United thus narrowed the definition of corruption, rejecting the 
broader understanding embraced in Shrink Missouri and McConnell 
and purporting to settle the debate once and for all. 
If any doubt remained about the Roberts Court’s approach to 
campaign finance law in the wake of Citizens United, it was laid to rest 
in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission.58 The Court struck 
down aggregate caps on contributions—limits on how much an 
individual could give to all federal candidates and political 
committees combined.59 Aggregate limits were first established in 
FECA and were upheld in Buckley.60 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
for the McCutcheon plurality doubled down on Citizens United’s 
narrow understanding of corruption: “[W]hile preventing corruption 
or its appearance is a legitimate objective, Congress may target only a 
specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.”McCutcheon 
thus makes it unmistakably clear that corruption means the quid pro 
quo exchange of money for political favors. It made no difference that 
the law reviewed in McCutcheon restricted contributions, which are 
formally subject to a lower level of scrutiny than expenditure 
restrictions. Thus, contribution limits may be justified before the 
Roberts Court if they are closely drawn to prevent the reality or 
appearance of quid pro quo corruption. Disparities of access and 
influence are simply beside the point. 
II.  THE ACADEMIC DEBATE 
Debates over the constitutionally permissible and tactically 
preferable rationales for regulating money in politics rage on, 
notwithstanding the turn taken by the Roberts Court. The debate is 
 
 55.  Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976)).  
 56.  Id. at 359. 
 57.  Id. at 360. 
 58.  134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).   
 59.  Id. at 1442. 
 60.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38. 
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particularly active among supporters of reform. The current 
incarnation centers around a conception of corruption put forward by 
Professor Lawrence Lessig in his 2011 book Republic Lost and the 
historical research by Professor Zephyr Teachout.61 Professor Lessig 
advances an argument based on “dependence corruption,” which he 
claims is mandated by an originalist view of the Constitution. 
Professor Richard Hasen has criticized Lessig’s proposed rationale, 
particularly his contention that dependence corruption is distinct 
from equality. As vigorous as the current debate has been, it is hardly 
the first time that reform-friendly scholars have debated the relative 
merits of anti-corruption and equality as rationales for reform. In this 
Part, we summarize the current debate as well as its earlier 
incarnation in the scholarship of Professors Daniel Lowenstein, Bruce 
Cain, and David Strauss almost two decades ago. We take no side in 
the recurrent debate over whether reformers should couch their 
arguments in terms of preventing corruption or promoting equality. 
Our goal, instead, is to examine these rationales with an eye toward 
developing the evidence that might support them before a future 
Court less hostile to regulation than the current one. 
A. Is Dependence Corruption Really Equality? 
Professors Lessig and Teachout are the leading exponents of a 
broader anti-corruption rationale in the current debate. Teachout 
excavates a free-standing anti-corruption principle embedded in the 
Constitution’s history and text which, like federalism or the 
separation of powers principle, should be given independent weight in 
constitutional contests.62 Her review of the Constitution’s text and the 
debates surrounding its creation produce evidence that the Framers 
were “centrally focused on corruption,”63 and that they commonly 
understood corruption in terms reaching beyond the narrow crime of 
bribery to the “self-serving use of public power for private ends.”64 
Teachout criticizes the Court’s case law on corruption in the political 
process as chaotic—undecided among five different conceptions of 
the problem—and argues that it should instead be “tethered to both 
the past and the present as an evolving standard,”65 much like the 
understanding of “cruel and unusual punishment” for Eighth 
 
 61.  Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009). 
 62.  Id. at 373 n.156. 
 63.  Id. at 373. 
 64.  Id. at 373–74. 
 65.  Id. at 411. 
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Amendment purposes. 
Building on Teachout’s work, Lessig proposes a “new” conception 
of corruption, which he characterizes as “the state of an institution or 
an individual that has developed a dependence different from a, or 
the, dependence intended or desired.”66 We say “new,” quotation 
marks and all, because central to Lessig’s legal argument is that the 
understanding of corruption he proposes is not new at all, but rather 
that which the Framers understood and imbued in constitutional text 
and structure. Rather than the ordinary meaning of corruption, in 
which bad-acting individuals engage in a quid pro quo, or even an 
aggregation of instances of quid pro quo corruption, dependence 
corruption means an institution has been drawn away from its 
intended course.67 In the case of Congress, the Framers’ intended 
course was a dependence “upon the People alone,” enforced by 
biennial elections in the House, by restrictions on executive 
appointments, and by blocking foreign gifts to government officials, 
among other provisions.68 Although he describes numerous ways in 
which Congress might be “dependence-corrupt,”69 the deviation from 
Congress’s intended dependence of greatest concern to Lessig is the 
importance of “the funders.”70 In order to run for office—or, perhaps 
more precisely, in order to compete—a candidate must first receive 
the support of the small percentage of Americans who contribute 
money to political campaigns, in what Lessig calls the “funding 
election.”71 
For Lessig, corruption inheres in representatives’ dependence 
upon funders not because of a contemporary moral judgment about 
the propriety of a private financing system or the aggregations of 
wealth,72 but because the Framers’ judgment in favor of the exclusivity 
of “the People.” Dependence on the funders is “corrupt” because it 
conflicts with the dependence on the People alone contemplated by 
 
 66.  Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 61, 65 (2013). 
 67.  LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST 226, 231 (2011). 
 68.  Id. at 129–31. See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Lawrence Lessig in Support of 
Appellee, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (No. 12-536), 2013 WL 3874388. 
 69.  See Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 
102 CAL. L. REV. 1, 15–19 (2014) (discussing a hypothetical “federalism primary” in which a 
state senate would choose the candidates for the general election for the state assembly—and 
therefore also the congressional candidates—and the White Primary Cases and United States  v. 
Classic). 
 70.  Lessig, Reply to Hasen, supra note 66, at 232–33. 
 71.  LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST, supra note 67, at 3–4. 
 72.  See id. at 11.  
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the Framers.73 That conflict of interest, Lessig argues, is the disease. 
The symptoms appear in the way that the improper dependence of 
representatives on funders “qualifies the democracy” by producing “a 
subtle, understated, perhaps camouflaged bending to keep the funders 
in the money elections happy.”74 Lessig argues that dependence 
corruption is an alteration to the original design of a particular 
ecosystem of influence. It is thus distinct not only from equality but 
also from corruption-as-bribery. 
Professor Hasen takes issue with Lessig’s dependence corruption 
rationale, particularly the claim that it is really distinct from the 
equality-based rationale rejected in Citizens United.75 Hasen views 
dependence corruption as ultimately animated by a concern for 
inequality, as was the anti-distortion rationale of Austin.76 
Dependence corruption “seeks to justify campaign finance laws on 
grounds that the laws distribute power fairly and correct a distortion 
present in an unregulated (or less regulated) system.”77 The distortion 
is the outsized influence of “the funders” over legislative outcomes 
relative to any popular support for their objectives.78 Lessig rejects the 
equality characterization, but Hasen finds further proof in Lessig’s 
central reform proposal: a voucher system.79 Legislators would still be 
dependent upon a subset of “the People,” namely those citizens whose 
vouchers they received, but because the unequal distribution of 
wealth is no longer a factor, the resulting skew is no longer a 
problem.80 
B. Equality, Corruption, and Conflicts of Interest 
Perhaps everything that seems new really is old. A previous 
incarnation of the debate over the relationship between corruption 
and equality took place on the pages of the University of Chicago 
 
 73.  Id. at 3.  
 74.  Id. at 4. 
 75.  Hasen and other scholars have also questioned Lessig’s originalist interpretation, 
although that angle of the debate is beyond our purposes here. See Richard L. Hasen, Is 
“Dependence Corruption” Distinct From a Political Equality Argument for Campaign Finance 
Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 ELECTION L. J. 305 (2013); Seth Barrett Tillman, Why 
Professor Lessig’s “Dependence Corruption” Is Not a Founding-Era Concept, 13 ELECTION L. J. 
336 (2014). 
 76.  See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126 HARV. L. REV. 550, 572 (2012).  
 77.  Hasen, supra note 75, at 311. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
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Legal Forum in 1995. In that round, Professors David Strauss and 
Bruce Cain took up the equality charge, responding to Professor 
Daniel Lowenstein’s thoughtful meditations on corruption published 
a few years earlier.81 
Professor Lowenstein’s approach bears more than a passing 
resemblance to the argument that Lessig has more recently made, 
albeit to a much broader audience. Lowenstein viewed corruption as 
an “essentially contested concept” in need of an intermediate theory 
of politics to explain the desired, uncorrupted baseline.82 Lowenstein 
sought to reconcile a legislative process “tainted with corruption” 
with the recognition that both legislators and lobbyists “by and large, 
are not corrupt.”83 Where Lessig found an originalist answer, seeing 
the problem as a deviation from the Framers’ intended dependence, 
Lowenstein saw the problem functionally—as a conflict of interest.84 
Taking on the perception of some campaign finance reformers 
that campaign contributions buy influence with elected officials, 
Lowenstein observed that the empirical research on the claim was 
mixed, though in part by taking a too-narrow view of the legislative 
process.85 The lack of hard empirical evidence did not, for Lowenstein, 
support the conclusion by many analysts that “concern over 
contributions may be minimized” because of the complexity of 
intertwined interests influencing legislative behavior.86 The problem 
was not that campaign contributions were obviously the dominant 
force, nor was it that they were one insignificant wave in a sea of 
competing pressures, but that their presence created a conflict of 
interest for the recipient legislator. The conflict for legislators “exists 
when the consequences of a decision made in the course of a 
relationship of trust are likely to have an effect, not implicit in the 
trust relationship, on . . . the decisionmaker’s self-interest.”87 The 
relationship of trust, for Lowenstein, was “ethically significant,”88 
similar to a fiduciary relationship, and policing the conflicts requires 
 
 81.  See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 
32 UCLA L. REV. 784 (1985); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The 
Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301 (1989).  
 82.  Lowenstein, Political Bribery, supra note 81, at 851. 
 83.  Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 81, at 335. 
 84.  See Daniel P. Tokaji, Lowenstein Contra Lowenstein: Conflicts of Interest in Election 
Administration, 9 ELECTION L.J. 421 (2010).  
 85.  Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 81, at 322–23. 
 86.  Id. at 323. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 323 n.100. 
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looking to their effect on the average person, not one unusually 
susceptible to or resistant to acting in self-interest.89 
Lowenstein’s conflict of interest conception recognized that it 
would be impossible to isolate campaign contributions as the reason a 
legislator’s position moves on a particular issue. An issue arises 
against the backdrop of a complex array of considerations, including 
party platforms, the merits of the issue, constituency concerns, and the 
legislator’s knowledge of past contributions and expectations of 
future contributions. This background forms a legislator’s initial 
predisposition, which may be modified by any kind of new 
information, but even the way the new information is processed by 
the legislator is influenced by the original predisposition.90 A 
contribution may provide this new information and it “may or may 
not affect the legislator’s ultimate actions, but setting aside the most 
flagrant cases, no one can be sure, perhaps not even the legislator in 
question.”91 For this reason, Lowenstein argued the best way to 
understand the contribution’s effect on the legislative process was as a 
“taint”; like a drop of food coloring in a bowl of clear water, the 
contribution is “intermingled . . . in a way that cannot be isolated.”92 
Importantly, it is the comingling and not the change to the 
external appearance that represents the conflict for Lowenstein. He 
drew a distinction between a conflict of interest and an appearance of 
impropriety, finding a focus on appearances to be misleading: “It 
suggests that there is an underlying reality that is either proper or not 
proper, and if we could only look behind a locked door or, perhaps, 
into the legislator’s head, we would know.”93 For a conflict of interest 
approach, it does not matter that there was almost certainly never a 
moment behind a closed door when the legislator decided whether or 
not to succumb to the wishes of her donors; the problem is that the 
outcome results from an actual, tainted process.94 Thus, the rationale 
for campaign finance regulation is best conceived as addressing the 
reality of conflicts of interest rather than the appearance of 
corruption. 
 
 
 89.  Id. at 324. 
 90.  Id. at 324–25. 
 91.  Id. at 325. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 326. 
 94.  Id. 
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Like Professor Lessig in the current debate, Professor Lowenstein 
was met with the argument that his anti-corruption argument was 
really grounded in egalitarian concerns. For Professor Cain, 
preventing conflicts of interest was a “defensible basis [for campaign 
finance regulation] for those who equate representation with legal 
trusteeship or those who find ethical formulations of democracy 
persuasive,”95 but offered no assistance to those who see democracy as 
defined procedurally.96 Under the latter approach, the greatest 
concerns are that individuals have sufficient information to make 
informed choices;97 that the choices reflect autonomous, un-coerced 
preferences;98 and that democratic structures are concerned with 
equity of participation, influence, and outcome.99 Regulation of 
campaign money may affect any or all of these concerns, but the kinds 
of proposals aimed at limiting the corrupting influence of large or 
improperly-sourced contributions are primarily rooted in a desire to 
enhance equality. 
Professor Strauss questioned the conventional treatment of 
corruption and inequality as distinct problems.100 He offered as a 
thought experiment a world in which everyone has an exactly equal 
opportunity to contribute to a legislator and, in exchange, receive 
some desired legislative action.101 Without equality as a concern, the 
exchange loses its corrupt flavor. In fact, he proposed, there may be 
ways in which responsiveness to campaign contributions (in the 
hypothetical world of perfect equality) may be more democratic than 
the ways representatives respond to voters, specifically in the ability 
to express intensity and to disaggregate a legislator’s many positions 
for approval or disapproval.102 Strauss ultimately concludes that 
equality is the core concern of campaign finance reform efforts and 
likely the one easiest to justify,103 although not without its own 
problems as a rationale, particularly whether the political system can 
 
 95.  Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 111, 122. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 126. 
 98.  Id. at 123. 
 99.  Id. at 135–38. 
 100.  David A. Strauss, What Is The Goal Of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 141, 142 . 
 101.  Id. at 143–44; see also David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance 
Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1373–75 (1994). 
 102.  Strauss, Goal of Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 100, at 144–45. 
 103.  Id. at 158. 
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be trusted with it and whether it is ultimately worth the cost.104 
Strauss’s argument bears a strong resemblance to that which Hasen 
has recently advanced. Both contend that a broad anti-corruption 
rationale is rooted in a theory of political equality.105 
Our goal in this Part has been to summarize the academic debate 
over anti-corruption and equality rationales in its present and 
previous incarnations. We do not take a position on whether the 
ultimate goal of regulation is best conceived of as promoting equality 
or preventing corruption. In fact, we think that what unifies these 
approaches to reform is more important than what separates them. 
Whether one favors the anti-corruption or equality rationale, conflicts 
of interest are a serious problem. From an anti-corruption standpoint, 
conflicts of interest taint the political process, potentially diverting 
legislators from their responsibility to serve their constituents’ 
interests or the public interest. From an egalitarian standpoint, 
conflicts of interest are a problem because they contravene the basic 
principle that all citizens should have equal influence on politics, 
regardless of wealth. Thus, while not denying that something 
meaningful is at stake in the theoretical debate over which rationale 
to develop and argue before a future Supreme Court, we think a far 
more important question asks what type of evidence should be 
developed to document conflicts of interest arising from the existing 
system of campaign finance. It is to this question that we now turn, 
focusing on the types of evidence developed in past cases—most 
notably, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, which included 
the most extensive record in any case to date. 
III.  THE PREVIOUS RECORD: MCCONNELL 
Any good theory of politics should ultimately confront on-the-
ground reality. We do not know whether a future Supreme Court, 
more sympathetic to reform than the current one, will prefer an 
equality-based rationale to an anti-corruption rationale for campaign 
finance reform. We do know, however, that reformers will have the 
burden of developing a factual record for both legislation and 
litigation. Evidence regarding conflicts of interest in our current 
system will be vital to shaping appropriate regulations and 
shepherding them through the legislative process. And ultimately, that 
 
 104.  Id. at 158–59; see also Strauss, Corruption, supra note 101, at 1383–88. 
 105.  See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 76.  
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evidence will be vital in defending those reforms in court. This creates 
a challenge for proponents of reform, including social scientists and 
lawyers, given the uncertainty about which rationales will be 
acceptable to the next Court. 
To determine what evidence should be developed for future 
legislation and litigation, we look back. Without question, the most 
expansive evidentiary record created to date in a campaign finance 
case is the one developed in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission.106 The Supreme Court considered a consolidated case 
made up of eleven separate lawsuits filed by a total of seventy-seven 
plaintiffs, who had, along with the government and dozens of 
defendant-intervenors, produced more than forty-one boxes of 
evidentiary submissions containing the testimony and declarations of 
over 200 witnesses and 100,000 pages of material.107 A three-judge 
district court heard from twenty-four attorneys during nine hours of 
oral arguments and read 1,676 pages of briefing by the parties alone.108 
Its complex ruling—which spanned four opinions, including a per 
curiam on some sections of the law and an additional opinion by each 
judge—required more than 774 pages, more than one-third of which 
were dedicated to findings of fact.109 Here, we examine how the 
Supreme Court used those factual findings to support some of its key 
legal conclusions, drilling down to the specific pieces of evidence 
relied on by the district court. A careful examination of the 
McConnell record—both what it included and what it did not—is 
helpful in considering what evidence should be developed for the next 
generation of reforms. We categorize this evidence by subject, with 
the primary factual findings on which the Court rested in italics, 
followed by a description of the evidence supporting each finding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 106.  Justice Breyer’s dissent in the recent McCutcheon decision reiterates this point, 
reviewing some of the evidence produced in McConnell to support his broader view of 
corruption. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1469–70 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 107.  McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 208–09 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance 
Law, 3 ELECTION L. J. 147, 147 n.2, 166 n.131 (2004). 
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1. Soft-money contributions to national party committees give rise 
to corruption or the appearance of corruption.110 
The Court’s ultimate conclusion that BCRA’s soft-money 
regulations were justified on anti-corruption grounds began with the 
understanding that “contributions to a federal candidate’s party in aid 
of that candidate’s campaign threaten to create—no less than would a 
direct contribution to the candidate—a sense of obligation.”111 The 
Court followed a multi-step path to get from that baseline, established 
in Buckley,112 to its upholding of BCRA’s soft-money ban. First, the 
Supreme Court found that the candidates, donors, and national party 
committees had made use of the “soft-money loophole”113 to funnel 
money raised outside of FECA’s source and amount restrictions 
through the national parties for the benefit of particular campaigns. 
The Supreme Court relied on the district court’s findings. Those 
findings were in turn based on testimony from major donors, 
lobbyists, party officials, and Members of Congress, as well as 
evidence of the national party committees’ fundraising activities. 
Those activities included keeping tallies of the money raised by 
individual officeholders, distributing lists of party donors to 
officeholders, and the use of joint fundraising committees. 
The McConnell findings rested on multiple types of evidence. 
Member testimony, for example, included both general statements 
about the practice of raising soft money114 as well as specific testimony 
relaying Members’ own experiences raising money.115 The evidence 
 
 110.  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144–54 (2003). For each of the items discussed in this 
section, we have provided a citation to the pages in McConnell where the Court’s conclusions 
and factual discussions appear. We omit further citations to the Supreme Court decision within 
each subsection and include citations to the opinions of the District Court judges. 
 111.  Id. at 144. 
 112.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) (upholding FECA’s limitation on party 
contributions as a means of preventing circumvention of the $1,000 candidate contribution 
limit). 
 113.  Although “a literal reading of FECA’s definition of ‘contribution’” would have 
required mixed federal/non-federal activities such as generic party advertising and get-out-the-
vote drives to be funded with hard money, a series of FEC decisions in the late 1970s allowed 
political parties to use a mix of hard and soft money. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 123 n.7. Another 
ruling by the FEC in 1995 further expanded the available uses of soft money by parties to fund 
advertisements mentioning the name of a federal candidate, “so long as they did not expressly 
advocate the candidate’s election or defeat.” Id. at 124. 
 114.  See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 471 (2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) 
(quoting Declaration of Senator John McCain, “Soft money is often raised directly by federal 
candidates and officeholders, and the largest amounts are often raised by the President, Vice 
President and Congressional party leaders.”). 
 115.  See, e.g., id. (quoting Declaration of former Senator Paul Simon, “While I was in 
Congress, the DCCC [Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee] and the DSCC 
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also included admissions in declarations by congressional party 
committee officials that their committees “ask Members of Congress 
to raise funds in specified amounts or to devote specified periods of 
time to fundraising.”116 Corroborating documentary evidence was also 
important, including solicitations from party committees linking the 
potential donations to the re-election efforts of particular 
officeholders as well as letters from donors indicating which Member 
should get credit for donations to the party.117 There was also evidence 
disputing assertions by plaintiffs that they did not use federal officials 
to solicit major donors118 and, in the case of Senator McConnell, that 
he was not aware of the donation history of individuals with whom he 
met.119 
Another key finding was that soft-money donors often gave to 
party committees not for ideological association and expression, but 
rather because they were “seeking influence, or avoiding 
retaliation.”120 On this point the Court relied on the testimony of 
Robert Rozen, a lobbyist and partner at the firm of Washington 
Council Ernst & Young who had experience organizing fundraisers 
for federal candidates and advising clients on political contributions.121 
Rozen testified to the motivations of donors: 
They give soft money because they believe that’s what helps 
establish better contacts with members of Congress and gets doors 
opened when they want to meet with Members. There is no 
question that money creates the relationships. Companies with 
interest before particular committees need to have access to the 
 
[Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee] would ask Members to make phone calls seeking 
contributions to the party. They would assign me a list of names, people I had not known 
previously, and I would just go down the list. I am certain they did this because they found it 
more effective to have Members make calls.”). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 473 (citing, e.g., a letter soliciting donation to the National Republican Senatorial 
Committee (NRSC) signed by Senator McConnell; letter from Republican National Committee 
[RNC] contributor stating that “Congressman Scott McInnis deserve [sic] most of the 
recruitment credit.”). 
 118.  See id. at 474 (contrasting a statement by the RNC Finance Director that it was 
“‘exceedingly rare’ for the RNC to rely on federal officeholders for personal or telephonic 
solicitations of major donors” with a letter from the RNC Chairman to Senators asking to use 
their names for a membership recruitment package and with handwritten notes divvying up lists 
of donors among Members to call for solicitations). 
 119.  See id. at 486–87 (comparing testimony of Senator McConnell with letter sent to a 
contributor thanking him for a donation and specifically noting the handwritten addendum: “As 
you may recall, any contributions to my ’02 campaign will count against your $25,000 annual 
hard money limit in ’02 + not ’99. Hope you can help.”). 
 120.  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 96, 148 (2003). 
 121.  See id. at 147–48; McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 472 n.46, 492–93 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 
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chairman of that committee, make donations, and go to events 
where the chairman will be. Even if the chairman is not the type of 
Member who will tie the contribution and the legislative goals 
together, donors can’t be sure so they want to play it safe and 
make soft money contributions. The large contributions enable 
them to establish relationships, and that increases the chances 
they’ll be successful with their public policy agenda. Compared to 
the amounts that companies spend as a whole, large political 
contributions are worthwhile because of the potential benefit to 
the company’s bottom line.122 
The Court also found probative Rozen’s testimony as to the 
response soft money donations elicited from Members of Congress: 
You are doing a favor for somebody by making a large [soft 
money] donation and they appreciate it. Ordinarily, people feel 
inclined to reciprocate favors. Do a bigger favor for someone—
that is, write a larger check—and they feel even more compelled to 
reciprocate. In my experience, overt words are rarely exchanged 
about contributions, but people do have understandings.123 
According to this testimony, a sense of obligation was borne out of 
the need to keep the financial well from running dry. As Rozen 
further testified: “Too often, Members’ first thought is not what is 
right or what they believe, but how it will affect fundraising. . . . When 
you don’t pay the piper that finances your campaigns, you will never 
get any more money from that piper.”124 Other current and former 
Members’ testimony described, in general terms, the reasons donors 
gave large amounts to political parties.125 
The Supreme Court found it “[p]articularly telling” that a majority 
of top soft-money donors “gave substantial sums to both major 
national parties,”126 showing that many donors’ motivations were to 
secure access and influence.127 It rejected the Plaintiffs’ contention 
that defendants were obligated to produce “concrete evidence of an 
 
 122.  McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 492–93 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 
 123.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 147 (citing McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 493 (Kollar-Kotelly, 
J.)).  
 124.  Id. at 149 (quoting Declaration of former Senator Alan Simpson). 
 125.  McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 490 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting testimony by former 
Senators Rudman, Bumpers, Wirth, Brock, and Boren). 
 126.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 148. 
 127.  The Court relied on findings from Judge Kollar-Kotelly, who in turn relied on a report 
from Defendants’ expert Thomas Mann, corroborated by the testimony of a major corporate 
donor and internal documents produced by Eli Lilly & Co. showing concern that the company’s 
donations were lopsided to the Republican Party. McConnell, F.Supp.2d at 508–10 (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.). 
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instance in which a federal officeholder has actually switched a vote 
(or, presumably, evidence of a specific instance where the public 
believes a vote was switched).”128 It was sufficient that the Defendants 
introduced evidence of campaign contributions leading to access and 
influence. For example, the Court compared the “deeply disturbing 
examples’ of corruption” in Buckley,129 to the “similar examples of 
national party committees peddling access to federal candidates and 
officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations.”130 The 
Court focused particularly on the “menus of opportunities for 
access”131 described in detail by Judge Kollar-Kotelly of the 
McConnell district court. Her findings cited to handwritten notes by 
party leaders, promising to facilitate meetings and to pass on policy-
related correspondence from donors to Members of the House and 
Senate;132 she also cited to extensive details on party committee donor 
benefit programs which provided increasing levels of access to federal 
officeholders with higher donations.133 
Perhaps the most specific evidence on the influence arising from 
soft money came from two members of the U.S. Senate. The Court 
relied on testimony by former Senator Paul Simon, corroborated by 
testimony by then-current Senator Russ Feingold, of a “good example 
of [large contributors seeking legislative favors in exchange for their 
contributions] which stands out . . . because it was so stark and recent 
occurred on the next to last day of the 1995-96 legislative session”: 
Federal Express wanted to amend a bill being considered by a 
Conference Committee, to shift coverage of their truck drivers 
from the National Labor Relations Act to the Railway Act, which 
includes airlines, pilots and railroads. This was clearly of benefit to 
Federal Express, which according to published reports had 
contributed $1.4 million in the last 2 year cycle to incumbent 
Members of Congress and almost $1 million in soft money to the 
political parties. I opposed this in the Democratic Caucus, arguing 
that even if it was good legislation, it should not be approved 
without holding a hearing, we should not cave in to the special 
interests. One of my senior colleagues got up and said, ‘I’m tired of 
Paul always talking about special interests; we’ve got to pay 
 
 128.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 149. 
 129.  Id. at 150. 
 130.  Id. (citing 251 F.Supp.2d at 492–506).  
 131.  Id. at 151. 
 132.  McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 500–01 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 
 133.  Id. at 502–08. 
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attention to who is buttering our bread.’ . . . This was a clear 
example of donors getting their way, not on the merits of the 
legislation, but just because they had been big contributors. I do 
not think there is any question that this is the reason it passed.134 
In addition to Senator Simon’s specific recollection, the Court 
cited less specific testimony from Senators John McCain and Alan 
Simpson connecting soft-money contributions by the pharmaceutical 
industry, trial lawyers associations, and tobacco companies to 
“manipulations of the legislative calendar.”135 
It bears emphasis that the evidence of soft money’s actual 
influence on congressional action was rather thin. There was little if 
any evidence tying specific soft-money donations to specific 
legislative decisions. There was, however, abundant evidence that big 
soft-money contributions created conflicts of interest for legislators. 
The record showed that reasonable legislators would feel pressure to 
act in a particular way—even if they did not actually admit that their 
votes had been or would be influenced. 
2. State and local parties’ election activities create a significant risk 
of actual and apparent corruption, as well as the risk of circumvention. 
In addition to banning soft money contributions to national party 
committees, BCRA required that state and local parties use only hard 
money to fund federal election activity.136 An amendment to BCRA, 
sponsored by and named for Senator Carl Levin, carved out an 
exception allowing state and local party committees to pay for certain 
federal election activities with a prescribed ratio of hard money and 
soft money raised subject to a $10,000 annual per-person cap.137 Taken 
together, the Court found that Congress had designed the provisions 
 
 134.  Id. at 852 (Leon, J.); id. at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 
 135.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150–51. 
 136.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i(b)(1) (West 2003) 
invalidated by McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). The term “federal election activity” 
includes four categories of activities: (1) voter registration within 120 days before a federal 
election; (2) voter identification, GOTV, and other generic campaign activity conducted in 
connection with an election in which a candidate for federal office appears on the ballot; (3) any 
public communication that promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes a clearly identified candidate 
for federal office; and (4) the employment of a state party committee employee who spends 
more than 25 percent of her time working on federal election activities. § 431(20)(A)(i)–(iv). 
“Federal election activity” specifically does not include public communications and grassroots 
materials that refer solely to nonfederal candidates, contributions to nonfederal candidates, and 
state and local conventions. § 431(20)(B). 
 137.  § 441i(b)(2). See also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 162–64 (discussing the Levin 
Amendment). 
STRAUSETOKAI 10.24.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2014  4:34 PM 
202 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9:1 
to “construct[ ] a coherent scheme of campaign finance regulation” 
and, in particular, to prevent “wholesale evasion” of the ban on soft 
money to national parties.138 
The first step in the Court’s analysis of the regulation of state and 
local parties was its consideration of the governmental interest it 
advanced. The Court found that Congress “both drew a conclusion”139 
and “made a prediction” through its restrictions on soft money.140 The 
conclusion was that state and local parties “function as an alternative 
avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces”141 present in soft 
money contributions to national parties. The prediction was that, once 
the flow of soft money to national parties stopped, state and local 
parties would become the next outlet through which soft money 
would creep into federal elections.142 Restrictions on state and local 
parties served the same governmental interest in preventing 
corruption as limits on national parties.143 
In assessing the asserted anti-corruption interest, the Court cited 
the testimony of former Senator Warren B. Rudman that “much of 
what state and local parties do helps to elect federal candidates,”144 
and that state parties would become the conduit for soft money in 
federal elections without new restrictions.145 The Court also found 
relevant federal candidates’ solicitation of donations to state parties 
from those who had hit their limits for giving directly to the 
campaign.146 It cited testimony by the RNC’s Chief Counsel that the 
national party commonly redirected maxed contributors to state 
parties, as well as a letter from Congressman Wayne Allard soliciting a 
contribution for the Colorado Republican Party as a means of 
“further help[ing his] campaign,” and expert testimony about 
cooperation among state and local parties.147 According to the Court, 
 
 138.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161. 
 139.  Id. at 164. 
 140.  Id. at 165. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 164–66. 
 144.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 164 n.59 (quoting McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 467 (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.)). 
 145.  Id. It is interesting to note that although Senator Rudman had left the Senate ten years 
before testifying in McConnell, the Court clearly gave weight to both the descriptive and 
predictive elements of his testimony.  
 146.  Id. at 164. 
 147.  Id. at 164 n.60 (quoting McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 479, and FEC v. Colo. 
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 458 (2001)). The citations were only examples 
chosen from many available in the district court record. See also McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 
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there was “at least as much evidence as there was in Buckley that . . . 
donations [made to state committees by federally maxed donors and 
solicited by candidates and parties] have been made with the intent—
and in at least some cases the effect—of gaining influence over 
federal officeholders.”148 
The evidence supporting restrictions on soft money to state and 
local parties appears sparse because the McConnell Court implicitly 
relied on its previous conclusion that soft-money contributions to 
national parties have a corrupting influence. There was virtually no 
evidence for Congress’s prediction that state parties would become 
the new conduits for soft money absent further regulation. Instead, 
the Court said that it owes “‘substantial deference to the predictive 
judgments of Congress’s . . . particularly when, as here, those 
predictions are firmly rooted in relevant history and common 
sense,”149 and concluded preventing the circumvention of FECA 
“clearly qualifies as an important governmental interest.”150 It gives no 
indication what “relevant history” or “common sense” Congress could 
rely on to support its anti-circumvention rationale beyond the “entire 
history of campaign finance regulation.”151 
On the question of tailoring, the Plaintiffs made three arguments 
for why the restrictions on state and local parties were not closely 
drawn to the asserted governmental interest. First, they argued that 
the restriction was overbroad in its sweep of state and local party 
work that might influence a federal election. The Court disagreed 
with regard to each category of “federal election activity,”152 noting 
that “[c]ommon sense dictates, and it was ‘undisputed’ below that a 
party’s efforts to register voters sympathetic to that party directly 
assist the party’s candidates for federal office.”153 The Court also 
observed that federal candidates “reap substantial rewards”154 from 
any efforts to turn co-partisans out to vote, even if federal candidates 
 
478–80 (citing to testimony of party officials and donors, documents showing solicitations from 
incumbent Members of Congress for soft money donations to state parties). 
 148.  Id. at 164–65. The evidence cited by the McConnell Court included examples from the 
1998 Senate Government Affairs Committee report in which donations to state Democratic 
committees were exchanged for access to and influence with federal officials. Id. at 165 n. 61. 
 149.  Id. at 165 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)). 
 150.  Id. at 165–66. 
 151.  Id. at 165. 
 152.  See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(20)(A)(i)–(iv) (West 
2003) invalidated by McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); see also supra note 136. 
 153.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 167 (citing 251 F.Supp.2d at 460). 
 154.  Id. at 167–68. 
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are not mentioned at either the registration or get-out-the-vote 
(GOTV) stage.155 It cited an expert report regarding the effect of 
generic campaign activity on federal candidates, the testimony by 
representatives of the national congressional party committees that 
they had transferred money to state and local parties for registration 
and GOTV efforts that had a “significant effect on the election of 
federal candidates,”156 and a letter from the California Democratic 
Party thanking a contributor and noting that the state party’s voter 
registration and GOTV efforts would help in federal elections.157 
The Plaintiffs’ second attack on the state and local party 
restrictions was that the Levin Amendment’s restrictions placed an 
unconstitutional burden on association among party committees.158 
The Court rejected the claim, finding the restrictions to be “justifiable 
anticircumvention measures”159 designed to protect a “delicate and 
interconnected regulatory scheme.”160 Here, as with other anti-
circumvention measures, there was little evidence specific to BCRA. 
Instead, the McConnell Court cited the record in Buckley, specifically 
the “intricate scheme” of American Milk Producers, Inc. to break up a 
$2 million donation to the Nixon campaign into hundreds of small 
contributions, as proof that donors could “readily circumvent” the 
$10,000 limit on contributions to a state committee’s Levin account.161 
Finally, the McConnell plaintiffs contended that the restrictions on 
state and local party committees would “prevent them from engaging 
in effective advocacy.”162 The Court found the parties’ claims on this 
 
 155.  Here the Court is addressing the first two categories of “federal election activity”—
voter registration and voter mobilization, specifically identification, get-out-the-vote, and other 
generic party activities. See § 431(20)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 156.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 168 (citing McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 459–61). 
 157.  Id. at 168 (citing McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 459). As for public communications by 
state and local parties, the Court referenced its subsequent discussion of the direct effect on a 
federal election of an advertisement that promotes or attacks a clearly identified candidate for 
that election, saying that the “record on this score could scarcely be more abundant.” Id. at 170. 
The final category, governing funds used to pay the salary of a state party employee who spends 
more than 25 percent of her time on work in connection with a federal election, went essentially 
unchallenged by the Plaintiffs, who failed to supply the Court with a reason to strike down the 
provision. Id. at 171. 
 158.  Id. at 171. The Levin Amendment prohibited (1) transfer of Levin funds (money 
subject to the annual $10,000-per-person cap, but no other source or amount restrictions) 
among state parties; (2) transfers of hard money to fund the portion of expenditures made 
under the Amendment that must be made with hard dollars; and (3) joint fundraising of Levin 
funds by state parties. Id. (discussing the Levin amendment, 26 U.S.C.A. § 323(b) (West 2014)). 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. at 172. 
 161.  Id. at 171–72 & nn.65–66. 
 162.  Id. at 173. 
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point “speculative and not based on any analysis.”163 The evidence 
consisted mostly of testimony by officials from California’s 
Democratic and Republican Parties discussing the impact they 
predicted BCRA would have on their organizations’ fundraising 
efforts.164 Here again, the evidence from both sides was rather sparse, 
and the Court gave the benefit of the doubt to those defending 
Congress’ judgment. 
3. Non-profit organizations could be used to circumvent the other 
soft-money prohibitions. 
In addition to limiting donations to party committees, BCRA also 
restricted donations to and solicitations for non-profit organizations 
that make expenditures in connection with federal elections.165 The 
Government defended these restrictions as anti-circumvention 
measures, designed to prevent the parties from “mobiliz[ing] their 
formidable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of access 
to federal officeholders, into the service of like-minded tax-exempt 
organizations that conduct activities benefitting their candidates.”166 
The Court saw an overbreadth problem with a flat ban on party 
donations to non-profits and construed the provision to allow parties 
to give hard dollars they had raised subject to BCRA’s limitations,167 
but otherwise upheld the provision on the anti-circumvention 
rationale. 
The evidence cited by the Court in upholding the non-profit 
restrictions supported two subsidiary factual findings: that activities of 
non-profit organizations benefited federal candidates, and that party 
committees solicited and donated money for these non-profits to 
 
 163.  Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 524 (2003)). 
 164.  In the district court, Judge Kollar-Kotelly specifically noted that the state party 
officials acknowledged they had not analyzed how the parties might change their fundraising 
operations to adapt to BCRA or how much of the non-federal money previously donated to the 
national parties would be redirected their way, and that the parties’ expert Prof. Raymond La 
Raja concluded in his dissertation (discussed in his cross examination and included as an exhibit 
thereto) that parties would adapt to new soft money restrictions, and that new rules would not 
particularly hamper parties already similarly constrained under state law. McConnell, 251 
F.Supp.2d at 524 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).  
 165.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i(d) (West 2003), 
invalidated by McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). The ban included organizations 
established under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code as well as § 527 organizations “other 
than a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the 
authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office.” Id. 
 166.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 175. 
 167.  Id. at 180.  
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support their federal electioneering. On the first, the Court offered 
the activities of the NAACP’s National Voter Fund and of NARAL in 
the run-up to the 2000 election as examples. 168 These groups’ efforts 
included direct mailings and phone calls responsible for “increased 
turnout (over 1996 numbers) among target groups”169 in the case of 
the NAACP and “mobiliz[ing] 2.1 million pro-choice voters”170 by 
NARAL, as shown by evidence cited in an expert report and a 
declaration by a NARAL official. 
The Court’s second finding, that parties solicited money to 
support the federal election activities of non-profits, reinforced the 
first finding. It also provided the factual ground for the Court’s legal 
conclusion that “Congress’ concerns about circumvention are not 
merely hypothetical.”171 Here, the Court gave a brief descriptive 
account of how parties aided in providing revenues to non-profits 
before BCRA, taken from conclusions of both the majority and 
minority in the 1998 Senate Report172 as well as findings of fact made 
in the district court.173 
Although not discussed in depth by the Supreme Court, the 
district court judges’ findings with regard to party relationships with 
non-profits were extensive and relied on a considerable range of 
evidence.174 For example, Judge Kollar-Kotelly relied on declarations 
by two large Democratic donors describing their conversations with 
party committees about which non-profits could make effective use of 
their donations.175 One of the donors testified “that the national 
Democratic Party played an important role in his decision to donate 
soft money to ‘certain interest groups that were running effective ads 
in the effort to elect Vice President Gore, such as NARAL. The 
assumption was that the funds would be used for television ads or 
some other activity that would make a difference in the Presidential 
 
 168.  Id. at 175 n.68. 
 169.  McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 522. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 176. 
 172.  Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 105-167 at 4013 (1998)) (“[I]n addition to direct contributions 
from the RNC to nonprofit groups, the senior leadership of the RNC helped to raise funds for 
many of the coalition’s nonprofit organizations . . . .”); id. (citing S. Rep. No. 105-167  at 5983 
(1998) (Minority Views)) (“Tax-exempt ‘issue advocacy’ groups and other conduits were 
systematically used to circumvent the federal campaign finance laws.”). 
 173.  Id. at 176, 179. 
 174.  See McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 517–20 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 848-50 (Leon, J.). 
 175.  Judge Leon cited one of the declarations, along with a statement in the congressional 
record by Senator John Glenn. Id. at 848. 
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election.’”176 With regard to Republican Party committees, both Judges 
Kollar-Kotelly and Leon cited documents showing donations made 
directly by the party.177 Although the letters accompanying the 
donations indicated the money was given in “recognition” of “efforts 
to educate and inform the American public,”178 the district court 
judges also cited a statement by then-National Republican Senatorial 
Committee (NRSC) Chairman Phil Gramm to the Washington Post 
that one of the donations was made “because [the NRSC] knew the 
funds would be used on behalf of several specific Republican 
candidates for the Senate,”179 painting the donations in more of a 
federal election-oriented light. 
Also significant was the rise of what the Supreme Court called 
“politician 527 groups.”180 Similar to leadership PACs, these groups 
were created by individual Members of Congress and caucuses 
seeking to increase their influence within the legislature and parties.181 
The key difference, however, is that unlike leadership PACs, politician 
527s were not subject to FECA’s source and amount limitations and 
so were able to raise “substantial sums of soft money from corporate 
interests, as well as from the national parties themselves.”182 The 
district court findings on this point were primarily supported by 
citations to a report by Public Citizen, an advocacy organization that 
had lobbied in support of BCRA’s passage.183 Both district court 
judges also relied on corroborating testimony by a major donor who 
stated that he gave $500,000 to “Daschle Democrats,” a 527 
organization that ran broadcast ads in South Dakota supporting 
Senator Tom Daschle,184 but the primary source for describing the 
flow of money through Member-centered 527s was the Public Citizen 
 
 176.  Id. at 517 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 
 177.  Id. at 517–18. 
 178.  Id. (quoting Letter to Nat’l Right to Life from the Republican Nat’l State Elections 
Comm., Oct. 18, 1996, with enclosed $500k donation; three letters to Americans for Tax Reform 
from the Republican Nat’l State Elections Comm., dated in October 1996, accompanying three 
donations totaling $3.6M from party committees).  
 179.  Id. at 518. 
 180.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 176. 
 181.  See generally McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 519–20 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 849–50 
(Leon, J.) 
 182.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 176. 
 183.  McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 519–20 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 849–50 (Leon, J.) 
(citing PUB. CITIZEN. CONG. WATCH, CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS’ SOFT MONEY ACCOUNTS 
SHOW NEED FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM BILLS 10–11 (2002), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/527_march212002.PDF). 
 184.  Id. at 519 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 850 (Leon, J. ). 
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report. 
4. The ban on corporate and labor electioneering communications 
was neither overbroad nor underinclusive.185 
The McConnell Plaintiffs did not challenge the government’s 
interest in banning electioneering communications funded from 
corporate and union treasuries—the challenge that would later prove 
successful in Citizens United. Instead, they asserted this corporate and 
union electioneering ban was both overbroad and underinclusive. The 
Supreme Court recognized that there was a dispute in the district 
court over what percentage of “genuine” issue advertisements would 
fall subject to the electioneering ban186—a “battle of the experts” 
waged over the analysis and conclusions in the Buying Time studies 
produced by the Brennan Center for Justice in 1998 and 2000.187 These 
controversial studies concluded that the vast majority of ads aired 
during the ban’s thirty- and sixty-day “blackout periods” had an 
electioneering purpose. The Court relied on the Annenberg Report,188 
the separate expert report by Krasno & Sorauf analyzing the same 
data as the Buying Time studies utilized, and the factual findings of 
Judges Kollar-Kotelly and Leon. 
In determining that the electioneering communications ban was 
not overbroad, Judge Kollar-Kotelly had found that most candidate-
centered issue advocacy is concentrated in the weeks surrounding 
federal elections,189 and cited an expert report analyzing scripts of 
issue advertisements.190  She found that “advertisements naming 
federal candidates, targeted to their electorate, and aired in the period 
before the election, influence voters,”191 citing testimony from political 
consultants, admissions by the National Association of Builders, and 
her own analysis of sixteen advertisements.192 Judge Leon likewise 
 
 185.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203–09. 
 186.  Id. at 206. 
 187.  For access to these studies, see Buying Time Homepage, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time (last updated June 1, 2013).  
 188.  KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR., ISSUE ADVERTISING IN 
THE 1999-2000 ELECTION CYCLE (2001), available at 
http://cdn.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2001_19992000issueadvocacy2 
.pdf. 
 189.  McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 573 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 
 190.  Id. at 561–63. 
 191.  Id. at 573. 
 192.  Id. at 573–75. Of the twenty-one advertisements proffered by the McConnell Plaintiffs 
to demonstrate overbreadth, Judge Kollar-Kotelly found that nine would not have been 
affected by BCRA; four mentioned federal candidates in the context of discussing a past vote 
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relied on his own reading of scripts of advertisements,193 as well as 
expert testimony and statements by the RNC political director.194 He 
cited the Buying Time study for the percentage of advertisements that 
lacked the “magic words” but nonetheless focused on influencing 
candidate elections.195 
As to the Plaintiffs’ claim that the electioneering communications 
provision was underinclusive because it left print and internet 
communications unregulated, the Supreme Court found that the 
“records developed in . . . litigation and by the Senate Committee 
adequately explain the reasons for this legislative choice,” specifically 
that “corporations and unions used soft money to finance a virtual 
torrent of televised election-related ads during the periods 
immediately preceding federal elections[.]” The Court found 
especially persuasive a six-volume 1998 report by the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs summarizing its “extensive 
investigation into the campaign practices of the 1996 elections.”196 In 
addition, the Court cited Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s finding that the 
provision was properly tailored by addressing only those forms of 
communication Congress found to be problematic.197 In reaching that 
conclusion, she relied on expert testimony regarding the prevalence of 
broadcast communications,198 as confirmed by testimony from 
witnesses involved in making the relevant advertisements, such as the 
 
and were found not to be probative of BCRA’s overreach; and that the remaining eight could 
not demonstrate overbreadth, even assuming it could be ascertained that they were truly not 
intended to affect a federal election. Id. Judge Kollar-Kotelly also examined an additional forty-
three advertisements, identified by her and by the Defendants as appearing in either the 
Plaintiff’s briefs or in testimony and excluded twelve for lack of information about their air 
dates; another thirteen because they did not mention a candidate for federal office; one by the 
ACLU because it was “clearly designed simply to provide the corporation standing to challenge 
BCRA” (per testimony and documents provided by the ACLU’s legislative director); and 
another by the AFL-CIO as not probative. Id. at 575–76. With regard to the remaining 
advertisements, Judge Kollar-Kotelly did not attempt to determine if their “true purpose was to 
affect an election,” but rather concluded that the evidence provided was not sufficient to render 
the electioneering provision overbroad and noted that “[i]f Plaintiffs were correct, that BCRA 
would have such an indelible effect on their ability to advertise about issues of importance to 
their organization, I would have expected a more robust showing[.]” Id. at 578. 
 193.  Id. at 826–27 (Leon, J.). 
 194.  Id. at 826. 
 195.  Id. Judge Leon expressed reservations about the 1998 version but found Buying Time 
2000 sound and persuasive. 
 196.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129. 
 197.  McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 569 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). The Court also cited to Judge 
Leon’s findings as to whether the provision was underinclusive, e.g. McConnell, 540 U.S. 93,  
148–50, but Judge Leon simply agreed with the findings of Judge Kollar-Kotelly. Id. at 799 
(Leon, J.). 
 198.  Id. at 569–70 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 
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AFL-CIO President’s Special Assistant for Public Affairs and other 
political consultants.199 
What lessons can be drawn from this review of the McConnell 
record? A close examination reveals scant evidence that either soft 
money or electioneering communications altered actions by Members 
of Congress. In other words, the evidence of actual influence was very 
thin. There was some evidence that soft money helped secure—and 
was intended to help secure—access to Members of Congress. But the 
record demonstrated something more than mere access. Taken as a 
whole, the McConnell record showed that soft money would cause a 
reasonable legislator to feel pressure to act in a particular way. It 
documented rampant conflicts of interest arising from soft money—
specifically, between legislators’ incentive to serve big soft-money 
donors on the one hand, and their obligation to serve the interest of 
their constituents and the public on the other. While much of the 
evidence was ostensibly directed at showing that BCRA’s restrictions 
were appropriately tailored, it also helped show the existence of an 
important governmental interest beyond quid pro quo corruption. 
Justice Breyer emphasized this point in his McCutcheon dissent, 
highlighting the ample evidence of “privileged access to and the 
pernicious influence upon elected representatives” documented in the 
McConnell record.200 This record painted a vivid picture of a Congress 
besieged by conflicts of interest. That was the forest that the 
McConnell Court saw through the trees of the voluminous record 
compiled in the district court. Of course, evidence of disparate access 
and influence is irrelevant to the Roberts Court, given its narrow 
definition of corruption as quid pro quo. Such evidence is, however, 
relevant to four justices on the current Court—and may someday be 
relevant to the majority of a future Court. We now turn to the 
development of a record for such a court. 
IV.  A RECORD FOR THE NEXT COURT 
As any good lawyer knows, telling a good story is more important 
to success in a courtroom than mastery of legal doctrine. In 
McConnell, BCRA’s supporters were able to tell a persuasive story of 
a campaign finance system rife with conflicts of interest. That story 
remains central to the debate over campaign finance regulation, even 
 
 199.  Id. at 570–73.  
 200.  McConnell, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1469 (2014) (Breyer, J. dissenting in part). 
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though it is irrelevant to five justices on the current Court. Justice 
Breyer’s McCutcheon dissent underlines the importance of attending 
to the political realities of money’s impact on the legislative process. 
At the same time, his dissent implicitly highlights a more subtle point. 
The evidence cited by Justice Breyer is more than a decade old. The 
ecology of money and influence that existed before BCRA is not the 
same ecology that exists today. Some of the same problems may still 
exist, to be sure, but the McConnell record tells us little or nothing 
about the current reality. Justice Breyer’s dissent thus suggests the 
need to update that record to document the realities of the current 
system of campaign finance. 
Any future reforms to the campaign finance landscape will 
demand a record-building effort at least equal to that engaged in for 
the McConnell litigation. In particular, a thorough evidentiary record 
will be critical in shaping the next generation of campaign financing 
reforms and defending them in court. We appreciate the intellectual 
energy devoted to articulating a rationale beyond quid pro quo for a 
future Court to use and agree with Professor Hasen’s call for scholars 
to “do more work defining and defending governmental interests that 
justify reasonable . . . campaign finance regulations.”201 But defining 
these interests is not the same as developing a record to document 
problems in the current system. Regardless of whether a future 
Supreme Court is more inclined to adopt a rationale founded in anti-
corruption (a la Lowenstein, Teachout, and Lessig have argued202) or 
equality (a la Strauss, Cain, and Hasen203), it will need an updated 
evidentiary record to shape and defend the next generation of reform. 
Even if a future Court is less hostile to reform than the current one, as 
we hope it will be, that Court is unlikely to rubber-stamp restrictions 
on campaign expenditures or contributions. Rather, it will demand 
documentation of both the reasons for regulation and its tailoring. 
It would be far better if the development of this record began well 
in advance of litigation being filed and even before legislation is 
proposed. At the front end, crafting the next generation of reforms 
will require empirical research, qualitative as well as quantitative, 
about the harms to be addressed and the likely consequences of the 
proposed change. Rather than deciding on a preferred theory of 
 
 201.  Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to 
Campaign Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 33 (2014). 
 202.  See supra notes 61–74 and accompanying text. 
 203.  See supra notes 75–105 and accompanying text. 
STRAUSETOKAI 10.24.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2014  4:34 PM 
212 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9:1 
regulation and designing a legislative approach to fit that theory, 
policymakers should tailor reforms to the problems that are 
documented by empirical researchers. This information will also be 
essential at the back end, in demonstrating that regulations address 
real-life problems and are appropriately drawn. 
Academics and advocates would therefore be well-advised to 
begin developing their evidentiary record now, rather than waiting 
until a more reform-friendly Court is in place. The story that we 
believe future reformers should try to tell—both for legislative bodies 
and for courts—is one of pervasive conflicts of interest. That is 
something more than mere access but less than actual influence. We 
first explain why this should be regarded as an urgent priority. Next 
we explain why research should focus on conflicts of interest in 
election law, regardless of whether one favors an equality or anti-
corruption rationale for regulation. Finally, we sketch out what types 
of evidence a record for the next Court might consist of. 
A. Why Worry about the Record Now? 
A robust and thorough record of the role of money in our political 
process matters at the legislative stage and at the litigation stage, as 
the story of BCRA demonstrates. Although the legislative record 
directly relating to BCRA was thin, the law was drafted in the wake 
of an extensive investigation by the Senate Government Affairs 
Committee (Thompson Committee).204 The Committee’s inquiry 
included three months of hearings and resulted in a published report 
totaling more than 9,000 pages. Both the McConnell district court and 
Supreme Court cited repeatedly to the Thompson Committee’s 
findings, including for inquiries into the purpose of BCRA, enacted 
four years after the investigation was complete. 
Following the Thompson Committee report, legislation that would 
eventually become BCRA was debated in three different Congresses, 
across five years, before the final version passed both chambers in 
early 2002. During those debates, Members of Congress spoke on the 
record about the role that soft money played in elections and in 
influencing the legislative process, with varying degrees of specificity. 
In addition to committee testimony given as BCRA moved through 
the legislative process, Congress also relied on studies by the 
 
 204.  The Thompson Committee report was issued to the United States Senate as S. REP. 
NO. 105-167 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105srpt167/pdf/CRPT-
105srpt167-pt6.pdf. 
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Annenberg Center and by the Brennan Center for Justice about the 
nature of so-called “sham issue ads.”205 
The story of BCRA spans multiple investigations by congressional 
Committees, large-scale studies by advocacy and academic 
organizations, and lengthy statements by Members of Congress that, 
perhaps because of the subject matter of the debates and legislation, 
the courts treated as testimony about hard facts in the real world of 
politics, rather than simply statements of legislative purpose or 
information about predictive judgments by the legislature. 
The first lesson from this history is that much of the burden for 
amassing the next record will have to be borne by academics and 
advocates. It appears unlikely, given the polarization of Congress and 
the widely-noted weakness of the FEC, that neither will develop a 
robust record on their own. For the next wave of changes to the 
campaign finance system, the burden of producing the information 
needed to legislate should be assumed to be on groups outside of 
Congress. Undoubtedly any new campaign finance regulation 
Congress crafts will soon thereafter be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court, which will be faced with the task of reviewing the evidence 
amassed in the legislation’s favor. The strength of the evidence 
required will depend in part on which side of the divide the legislation 
falls. As Professor Hasen has pointed out, Citizens United “shows the 
Court’s apparent strategy: keep the evidentiary standard on proving 
corruption low and the definition of corruption loose” for 
contribution limitations “but keep the evidentiary standard 
impossibly high and the definition of corruption extremely narrow 
when it comes to considering the constitutionality of spending 
limitations.”206 Hasen argues that this “evidentiary stacking-the-deck” 
allows the Court to avoid confronting the more challenging question 
of whether expenditure limits might in fact pass strict scrutiny with a 
broader conception of corruption.207 Policymakers and litigators 
should be prepared to meet the formidable evidentiary burdens 
growing out of almost four decades of constitutional precedent. 
The second lesson is that persuading the next Court to adopt a 
new rationale for regulation will require a substantial body of 
evidence. As the Court stated in Shrink Missouri, the “quantum of 
 
 205.  See supra notes 187–188 and accompanying text. 
 206.  Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
581, 617 (2011); see also Briffault, supra note 109, at 165–66. 
 207.  Hasen, supra note 206, at 617. 
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empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of 
legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and 
plausibility of the justification raised.”208 Accordingly, legislation that 
seeks to combat quid pro quo corruption or its appearance will not 
bear a heavy burden. But if it seeks to advance a new rationale for 
regulation, advocates of reform can expect to face an especially heavy 
evidentiary burden. That is true whether they ground their arguments 
in dependence corruption, equality, or both. It is obvious that an 
egalitarian rationale will bear a heavy burden. Advocates will have to 
produce evidence of inequality to overcome the Court’s precedent 
since Buckley finding the concept “wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.” Yet the burden on those who favor a dependence 
corruption rationale is not much lighter. Despite Professor Lessig’s 
argument that it is demanded by an originalist view of the 
Constitution, its debut will have to be grounded on something more 
than theory and history. It will require a substantial body of evidence 
that dependence corruption is really a problem. 
The third lesson to be drawn from past litigation is the wide 
variety of evidence considered by the Court. That includes qualitative 
empirical research, as well as quantitative work. Important to nearly 
all points were on-the-record statements by key players in the 
political process. These included not only Members of Congress and 
party officials, but also political consultants and campaign operatives, 
as well as large individual donors and PAC and corporate heads. Also 
crucial was the documentary evidence—some of which would only 
come through discovery (internal memos and emails, hand-written 
notes from Members of Congress thanking donors) but many were 
publicly available and, in the age of the internet, their contemporary 
corollaries may be readily obtainable today. McConnell also highlights 
the importance of social science research, and even of research done 
by organizations with a particular agenda, provided that work is 
methodologically sound. 
A strong record is essential both to document the interests served 
by legislation, and to show that it is appropriately tailored. Too often, 
the tailoring prong is glossed over in academic discussions of 
campaign finance,209 yet it is critical to the Court’s evaluation of 
regulation.210 For all of the evidence the Court sifted through in 
 
 208.  Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000). 
 209.  See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 66, at 69 n.33. 
 210.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 166–74 (indicating that once the Court accepts the undue 
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McConnell to determine whether particular provisions were tailored 
appropriately, much of it was amassed in the course of litigation. We 
think that evidence of appropriate tailoring should be a part of the 
discussion from the beginning, not simply gathered in support of 
arguments made to the courts. Up front examination of the problems 
that exist in the real world is likely to be more persuasive to a court 
than post hoc studies, which may appear ginned up to reach a desired 
result. While the McConnell Court gave considerable deference to 
Congress’s “predictive judgments,”211 it is less likely to defer to such 
judgments about the interests served by regulation or its tailoring. 
This article has deliberately eschewed discussion of the contours that 
future reforms should take, because we believe that those should be 
firmly rooted in evidence of the problems created by the flow of 
money into politics. 
B. Why Focus on Conflicts of Interests? 
We think that academics and advocates seeking to lay the 
groundwork for the next generation of reform should focus their 
attention on conflicts of interest arising from money in politics. As our 
title indicates, this is something more than a showing of mere access, 
but less than actual influence. Thus, for example, evidence that those 
making independent expenditures enjoy disproportionate access 
would not be enough. On the other hand, supporters of reform would 
not be required to show that independent expenditures actually 
changed anyone’s vote. They would, however, be required to show 
conflicts of interest—that a reasonable legislator would feel pressure 
to act in way that is different from the preferences of her constituents 
and the public interest. 
We think that the evidentiary record should focus on conflicts of 
interest, regardless of whether one is more inclined toward a 
dependence corruption or egalitarian theory of reform. As Professor 
Lowenstein noted, a conflict of interest can exist regardless of 
whether there is a moment behind closed doors—or simply inside a 
legislator’s own head—in which the decision is made to succumb to 
the wishes of a donor.212 Because it does not require inquiry into the 
hidden moment of potentially improper decision-making, evidence of 
 
influence anti-corruption rationale at the beginning, every other provision is examined for 
tailoring questions). 
 211.  Id. at 165.  
 212.  See Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 83, at 326. 
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conflict of interest will likely be easier to amass. The evidence is both 
more likely to be out in the open and less likely to require admitting 
to any bad intent by contributors or weakness by legislators. 
Again, we do not deny that there are significant differences 
between dependence corruption and egalitarian theories of campaign 
finance regulation. Nor do we deny that there may be some 
differences at the margins of what sort of evidence proponents of 
these views might try to develop. But we do not think it necessary to 
become enmeshed in—or, worse still, consumed by—this theoretical 
argument at the evidence-gathering stage. In fact, we think that this 
conflict can easily and productively be sidestepped. The search for 
conflicts of interest is necessarily an objective one: it asks whether a 
particular incarnation of campaign money (be it in the form of 
contributions to a candidate or to a leadership PAC, or direct 
spending through another entity) would cause a reasonable legislator 
to feel pressure to act in way that is different from the preferences of 
her constituents and the public interest. The inquiry centers around 
examining the effects of campaign spending, rather than the purpose 
behind that spending. It also avoids the problem inherent in trying to 
measure the actual effects of spending and donations. A conflicts of 
interest approach does not require one to believe that money 
“corrupts” the legislative process or that it results in policymaking 
that departs from some theoretically “pure” baseline.213 The question, 
again, is whether it creates an incentive for legislators to act in a way 
that is different from the preferences of their constituents or the 
public interest. It may also suggest reforms that respect First 
Amendment concerns while still mitigating harms to the democratic 
process that might result from the current ecology of campaign 
finance regulation. For example, a legislative body concerned with 
conflicts of interest may consider changing internal rules to include 
disclosure and walling-off rules such as those used by law firms or the 
requirements of corporate directors.214 
 
 213.  By contrast, a search for evidence that fits within an equality rationale framework, for 
example, first requires setting an “equal” baseline. Evidence developed to fit an “undue 
influence” or other corruption-based rationale necessitates an “uncorrupted” baseline. 
 214.  See, e.g., Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 217, 231–33 (2010) (suggesting a system of “legislative recusal” for winning candidates 
whose campaigns have benefited from especially large expenditures, enforceable not by the 
judiciary but as an ethic required of legislators by the voters). See also, Eugene Mazo, The 
Disappearance of Corruption and the New Path Forward in Campaign Finance, 9 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y. (forthcoming 2014). 
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But conflicts of interest cannot merely be assumed. They must 
actually be proven. In the next section, we consider the types of 
evidence that those seeking to document conflicts of interest arising 
from campaign money might look to. 
C. What Should the Evidence Look Like? 
If the extensive McConnell record shows anything, it is that 
Congress and the courts will need information from a plethora of 
sources in order to reach the kinds of legal conclusions that the 
academics debating over the best rationale would have them make. 
Taking guidance from both the academic literature in Part III and our 
canvass of the McConnell record in Part IV, we offer the following 
suggestions of what evidence might be developed by researchers. 
Member statements: The Court’s consideration of the McConnell 
record shows that testimony by current and former Members of 
Congress is important for both their general descriptions of the role 
of money in politics and for specific examples of their own 
experiences. An update of McConnell’s record, to document conflicts 
of interest in the current system, is now in order. Qualitative 
researchers should interview current and recently retired or defeated 
Members about what effect, if any, non-party independent spending 
has on the legislative process. For example, research focused on 
illuminating conflicts of interest might ask how aware Members are of 
non-party independent spenders active in their own races; whether 
they have ever received threats of oppositional spending or promises 
of favorable spending (either direct or implied) in connection with 
particular legislative action; whether independent spending is 
considered as a factor in deciding on various legislative actions such 
as introducing bills, making statements or asking questions in 
committees, or expressing support more or less publicly for a 
particular issue. 
It is important, however, that researchers do not limit their 
universe of interview subjects to Members of Congress favorable to 
campaign finance reform efforts. As Bob Bauer has written, the 
“acknowledged experts” in campaign finance debates are those 
“politicians who are convinced that money accounts for certain 
legislative behavior, and who have solutions to offer.”215 Regardless of 
 
 215.  Bob Bauer, What To Do About The Court:  Two Views, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD 
LAW (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/10/what-to-do-about-the-
court-two-views/. 
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whether one agrees with this assessment to date, it should serve as a 
note of caution to avoid the bias that can come with looking for 
evidence to fit a pre-determined rationale or regulatory proposal. 
Even for reform-minded scholars, the goal of research should be an 
accurate description of the political world as it is, not simply as it is 
assumed to be. 
Statements by other political actors: In addition to Member 
statements, the McConnell record reveals the importance of 
interviews with candidates, campaign consultants, and donors. To this 
group, we would also add congressional staff. Members’ staff—both 
from campaigns and from official offices—can provide more detailed 
information about the ongoing relationships with and lobbying efforts 
by individuals and organizations engaged in independent spending. 
Staff might also be asked about the timing of fundraisers to coincide 
with legislative action—for example, where a committee holds a 
hearing on a particular subject and a Member of that committee holds 
a fundraiser with stakeholders shortly before or after the hearing, how 
might internal office practices such as Member briefing and staff 
assignments either separate or elide the hearing and fundraiser? 
Researchers might also inquire as to whether campaigns are aware of 
the identities of contributors to supportive non-party independent 
spending organizations and whether information of such “soft money” 
contributions to outside groups is passed on to the candidate or 
Member. Interviews with donors and consultants for independent 
spending groups might follow along the same lines, asking whether 
they discuss legislative agendas with Members in the context of 
fundraisers, whether they receive notes of thanks from Members for 
their contributions to outside groups, and the outside group and 
donor perspective of Member perception of their efforts. 
Empirical research: On the empirical front, future legislators and 
courts concerned with conflicts of interest would benefit from analysis 
of the timing of legislative decisions and public statements and 
fundraising materials of independent spending groups, as well as 
survey research of Members of Congress. For example, research might 
ask whether there is ever a correlation between independent 
spending targeted at a Member and legislative action taken by that 
Member, such as signing on to a bill as a co-sponsor or proposing an 
amendment in committee. Similarly, surveys might also examine 
whether independent spending activated a Member’s constituents and 
caused them to contact their representative’s office or campaign, 
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perhaps indicating where constituent support or opposition played a 
mediating role between the outside group and the Member’s 
legislative decision. 
One type of evidence that was especially persuasive to the courts 
in McConnell was documentary evidence of fundraising practices such 
as solicitation letters, thank you letters, and fundraising “menus” 
describing the events with Members of Congress available at certain 
levels of giving. Without the help of discovery rules available to 
litigants, academic researchers may have difficulty amassing similar 
documentary evidence. However, to the extent that such information 
is available publicly, it should be retained and cataloged for possible 
analysis. Potential research questions might include whether 
independent spending groups advertise access to Members of 
Congress to their donors, how outside groups describe their impact on 
the legislative process, and whether Members indicate—either 
through direct appreciation or other public statements—knowledge 
of efforts by independent spending organizations’ efforts and 
agendas. 
Additionally, scholars studying Congress should look to the work 
of Professor Lynda W. Powell on the influence of money in state 
legislatures for models of survey research on this topic.216 Her 
extensive survey of state legislators investigated the extent to which 
campaign contributions influence the legislative process, looking 
beyond the usual measure of money-for-votes to a far richer 
conception of legislative output. Professor. Powell’s investigation 
considered both institutional features such as term limits and size, as 
well as members’ individual decisions about how much time to spend 
fundraising. To the extent that similar research can be done about 
Congress and ask about not only direct contributions but outside 
spending as well—especially in its look beyond the final roll call votes 
to myriad of other points at which money might influence the 
legislative process and focus on the experience of legislators 
themselves—it would provide an important contribution to the 
courts’ understanding of the world of campaign finance. However, the 
responsibility for producing rigorous research here does not fall solely 
on the shoulders of academics—Members of Congress must be willing 
to participate. Leadership of both parties should encourage their 
 
 216.  E.g. LYNDA W. POWELL, THE INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN STATE 
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Legislative Process, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 75 (2014). 
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rank-and-file to respond to academic surveys. Organizations such as 
the American Political Science Association should develop 
relationships with congressional Member and staff organizations 
willing to assist researchers. 
Press reports: Finally, the McConnell record and Professor 
Lowenstein’s work should serve as reminders of the important role of 
journalists in building a record to inform legislative and litigation 
efforts, as well as the academic debates over rationales for regulation. 
Lowenstein noted that press reports of linking legislative actions on 
matters of interest to contributors and contributions are often 
belittled as anecdotal and unimportant, but because conflicts of 
interest are not about looking for a “smoking gun,” the press accounts 
can offer useful descriptions of the “complexity and the ambiguities in 
the process.”217 As an example, Lowenstein offers articles in the Wall 
Street Journal by Brooks Jackson and Jeffrey Birnbaum about efforts 
by Rep. Bob Matsui to repeal a tax provision favored by public utility 
companies.218 The articles include statements by both Matsui and 
lobbyists for the utility companies about how the companies used 
money (in the form of contributions and now-illegal honoraria) to 
influence legislators, as well as details about a Member who had co-
sponsored the bill and then had his name removed from the 
legislation after receiving the money.219 It may be that reporters are in 
the best position to discover and describe the “complexity and 
ambiguities” that give rise to conflicts of interest in the first place, and 
researchers should look to journalists’ investigative work for starting 
points to dig deeper into the political process as it is, not as a 
theoretician might imagine it to be. 
CONCLUSION 
Development of an evidentiary record supporting the next 
generation of campaign finance reforms should begin now. Important 
as the academic debate over theories of reform may be, it should not 
forestall qualitative and quantitative empirical research on our 
current system. In fact, there is common ground that conflicts of 
interest are problematic, among those on both the dependence 
corruption and equality sides of the theoretical debate. We therefore 
argue that the primary focus of such research should be on 
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documenting conflicts of interest arising from the flow of campaign 
money into our system—something more than a showing of access, 
but less than actual influence. Such research will be essential both in 
crafting appropriate legislation and in defending it in court. To be 
clear, we are under no illusions about the current Supreme Court, a 
majority of whose members are hostile to campaign finance 
regulation. No quantum of evidence will persuade them to change 
their minds. But the current Court will not sit forever. Academics, 
advocates, policymakers, and lawyers should not wait until a more 
sympathetic Court is in place before beginning the essential work of 
documenting conflicts of interest in our current system of campaign 
finance. 
